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Wandering Far Afield With
Defined Value Clauses
By Wendy C. Gerzog
In Wandry,1 the Tax Court held for the taxpayers,
finding that their gifts to their children and grand-
children in 2004 were gifts of fixed dollar amounts
equal to comparable amounts of family limited
liability company share units. Likewise, the court
decided that the defined value clause in their trans-
fer documents was not void as contrary to public
policy. The Wandry decision reinforces and expands
the Tax Court’s acceptance of defined value clauses.
That acceptance and expansion will routinely shift
the burden from the taxpayer to the IRS and the
courts to determine the number of nonmarketable
family limited partnership or LLC share units that a
donor has transferred to his family, without the
possibility of the government collecting any addi-
tional tax revenue.
In a fully stipulated case, the taxpayers formed
an FLP in 1998 with cash and marketable stock.
They had approached their attorney/CPA to make
tax-free gifts to their children and grandchildren. At
that time, a taxpayer’s annual gift tax exclusion was
$11,000 per donee and a donor’s lifetime gift tax
exclusion was $1 million. Because the value of their
FLP interests could not be ascertained ‘‘on any
given date,’’ the attorney advised them to make
gifts of a fixed dollar amount instead of a fixed
number of FLP units.2
In 2001 the taxpayers and their children formed
Norseman Capital LLC, a family business. By 2002
all the FLP’s assets were transferred to Norseman.
The taxpayers’ attorney made the same gift sugges-
tions as he did with the FLP.3 In 2004 the taxpayers
each made gifts to their children and grandchildren
totaling the nine beneficiaries’ annual exclusions,
plus, to the four children, a quarter of a million
dollars each, representing each donor’s lifetime gift
tax exclusion.4
The gift document stated, ‘‘Although the number
of Units gifted is fixed on the date of the gift, that
number is based on the fair market value of the
gifted Units, which cannot be known on the date of
the gift but must be determined after such date
based on all relevant information as of that date.’’5
Further, the instrument recited the donors’ inten-
tion to have an independent appraiser value the
number of units, with a proviso that if the IRS
challenged the number, it would be adjusted as
necessary ‘‘in the same manner as a federal estate
tax formula marital deduction amount would be
adjusted for a valuation redetermination by the IRS
and/or a court of law.’’6
The taxpayers intended to make gifts that fell
within the exempted amounts. Their attorney ex-
plained that if there were a revaluation, no units
would be returned to them; rather, there would be a
reallocation of their capital accounts to reflect the
actual gifts. On July 26, 2005, the appraiser valued a
1 percent LLC interest at $109,000.7 In 2004 the
taxpayers’ capital accounts decreased in the aggre-
gate by $3,603,311, increasing their children’s and
1Wandry v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-88, Doc 2012-6322,
2012 TNT 59-17.
2Those FLP transfers, however, were not before the court. Id.
at 2-3.
3Id. at 4 (‘‘(1) the number of Norseman membership units
equal to the desired value of their gifts on any given date could
not be known until a later date when a valuation could be made
of Norseman’s assets; (2) all gifts should be given as specific
dollar amounts, rather than specific numbers of membership
units; and (3) all gifts should be given on December 31 or
January 1 of a given year so that a midyear closing of the books
would not be required’’).
4Id. at 4-5.
5Id. at 5.
6Id.
7Id. at 6.
Wendy C. Gerzog
Wendy C. Gerzog is a
professor at the University
of Baltimore School of Law.
The Wandry decision ex-
tends the application of de-
fined value clauses beyond
those family limited partner-
ship cases that transfer any
excess value to a charity. In
Wandry, the Tax Court reads
Procter narrowly and ignores
the fundamental rationale of
Robinette.
Copyright 2012 Wendy C. Gerzog.
All rights reserved.
tax notes
®
ESTATE AND GIFT RAP
TAX NOTES, May 28, 2012 1171
(C
) Tax A
nalysts 2012. A
ll rights reserved. Tax A
nalysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content.
grandchildren’s capital accounts by approximately
$855,745 and $36,066, respectively. Each taxpayer’s
gift tax return for 2004 indicated the total fixed
value of his gifts, but described the gifts as 2.39 and
0.101 percent LLC interests, respectively, based on
the appraiser’s figure.8 Both the taxpayers and the
government agreed that as of January 1, 2004, those
percentage interests were worth $315,800 and
$13,346, respectively.9
The government argued that the taxpayers’
transferred fixed percentage interests exceeded the
applicable exclusions. Their gift tax return descrip-
tions constituted admissions, their capital account
adjustments reflected those descriptions, and their
gift documents transferred percentage interests.
Also, citing Procter,10 the government asserted that
the taxpayers’ adjustment clauses created a condi-
tion subsequent that was void as against public
policy.11 By contrast, the taxpayers maintained that
they did not transfer fixed LLC percentage interests,
but fixed dollar amounts, to their children and
grandchildren. Moreover, they contended that the
adjustment clauses were not contrary to public
policy.12
The court rejected the government’s reliance on
Knight13 to support its position that the taxpayers’
gift tax return description was an admission that
they had transferred percentage units to the donees
because, unlike the taxpayers in Wandry, the donors
in Knight argued at trial that their gifts were worth
less than the value listed on their return. Because of
that, the court in Knight held that the taxpayers had
not intended to make a gift of a fixed amount but
only percentage interest. The Wandry court held
that the taxpayers consistently maintained that they
had intended to make gifts of a fixed dollar
amount.14
The court also declined to adopt the govern-
ment’s view that the LLC’s capital accounts con-
trolled the nature of the taxpayers’ gifts. The court
stated that ‘‘the facts and circumstances determine
Norseman’s capital accounts, not the other way
around.’’15 Moreover, the court found the capital
account ledger ‘‘unofficial and unreliable.’’16
Finally, the court held that Procter did not control.
The court cited the clause used in Procter17 that
functioned to reverse a completed gift in excess of
the gift tax and stated the Fourth Circuit’s objec-
tions to the condition subsequent: ‘‘(1) any attempt
to collect the tax would defeat the gift, thereby
discouraging efforts to collect the tax; (2) the court
would be required to pass judgment upon a moot
case; and (3) the clause would reduce the court’s
judgment to a declaratory judgment.’’18
With particular reliance on Estate of Petter,19 the
Wandry court held that while a savings clause might
violate Procter, a formula value clause was unobjec-
tionable because ‘‘it merely transfers a ‘fixed set of
rights with uncertain value.’’’20 Likewise, the court
cited the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Estate of Petter
as ‘‘holding that although the value of each mem-
bership unit was unknown on [the transfer] date,
the value of a membership unit on any given date is
a constant.21
Applying the Ninth Circuit’s three-part test in
Estate of Petter to the facts in Wandry, the Tax Court
determined that under the gift document, the do-
nees were at all times entitled to receive predefined
LLC percentage units, expressed in a mathematical
formula; the value of an LLC unit, although un-
known when the gift documents were executed,
was a constant; and before and after the govern-
ment’s audit, the donees received the same LLC
percentage unit. Each child was entitled to receive
approximately a 1.98 percent interest, and each
grandchild approximately a 0.083 percent interest.22
Without the audit, the donees might not have
received their proper LLC percentage interest, ‘‘but
that does not mean that parts of petitioners’ trans-
fers were dependent upon an IRS audit.’’23
The court held:
It is inconsequential that the adjustment clause
reallocates membership units among peti-
tioners and the donees rather than a charitable
8Id. at 7.
9Id. at 8.
10Commissioner v. Procter, 142 F.2d 824 (4th Cir. 1944).
11Wandry, T.C. Memo. 2012-88, at 9.
12Id. at 10.
13Knight v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 506 (2000), Doc 2000-31015,
2000 TNT 232-11.
14Wandry, T.C. Memo. 2012-88, at 11-12.
15Id. at 15.
16Id. at 16.
17Id. at 17, citing Procter, 142 F.2d at 827 (‘‘In the event it
should be determined by final judgment or order of a competent
federal court of last resort that any part of the transfer in trust
hereunder is subject to gift tax, it is agreed by all the parties
hereto that in that event the excess property hereby transferred
which is decreed by such court to be subject to gift tax, shall
automatically be deemed not to be included in the conveyance
in trust hereunder and shall remain the sole property of’’ the
taxpayer).
18Id.
19Estate of Petter v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-280, Doc
2009-26779, 2009 TNT 233-14, aff’d, 653 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2011),
Doc 2011-16968, 2011 TNT 151-7.
20Wandry, T.C. Memo. 2012-88, at 20-21, citing Estate of Petter,
653 F.3d at 1023.
21Id. at 21, citing Estate of Petter.
22Id. at 23-24.
23Id. at 25.
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organization because the reallocations do not
alter the transfers. On January 1, 2004, each
donee was entitled to a predefined Norseman
percentage interest expressed through a for-
mula. The gift documents do not allow for
petitioners to ‘‘take property back.’’ Rather, the
gift documents correct the allocation of Norse-
man membership units among petitioners and
the donees because the K&W report under-
stated Norseman’s value. The clauses at issue
are valid formula clauses.24
The court held that there was no public policy
against formula clauses and that there were mecha-
nisms apart from an IRS audit, such as competing
interests of the LLC members, to ensure accurate
valuation. ‘‘Each member of Norseman has an
interest in ensuring that he or she is allocated a fair
share of profits and not allocated any excess
losses.’’25 Likewise, the court held that its opinion
did not undo the gift, decide a moot case, or issue a
declaratory judgment. That there is no charitable
donation in Wandry ‘‘does not result in a ‘severe and
immediate’ public policy concern,’’ the court
wrote.26
Knight
After forming an FLP, the taxpayers each trans-
ferred a 22.3 percent FLP interest to their children’s
trusts. After the transfers, the taxpayers each owned
a 4.9 percent limited partnership interest. The trans-
fer documents stated that each taxpayer transferred
the number of partnership units equal to $300,000.
The government cited Procter and Ward27 for its
position that the defined value clause was void as
contrary to public policy. Without deciding the
applicability of the government’s cited precedents,
the Tax Court held that the taxpayers had trans-
ferred percentage FLP interests. The taxpayers’ gift
tax returns stated their gifts were of 22.3 percent
FLP interests and omitted any reference to a dollar
value. Also, the taxpayers testified that their gifts
were actually less than the $300,000 value in their
transfer documents. Holding for the government,
the court held that the taxpayers had allowed the
court to address the government’s position that the
percentage interests constituted a value greater than
the $300,000 value.
Estate of Petter
The taxpayer made a part-gift, part-sale transfer
of family LLC units to two trusts and a charitable
donation of the units to two charitable foundations.
The transfer documents included both a defined
value clause and a reallocation clause. The realloca-
tion clause required gift transfers from the trust to
the foundations if the value of the units, as finally
determined for gift tax purposes, exceeded a fixed
dollar amount. After her IRS audit, the donor’s
units were deemed to have a lower value; conse-
quently, the foundations received additional units.
The taxpayer contended that she was entitled to
an additional charitable donation equal to the ad-
ditional units given to the foundations. Both the Tax
Court and the Ninth Circuit agreed with her. Ex-
plaining the reason for employing a family LLC, the
circuit court said:
Anne could have transferred her UPS stock
outright, but doing so would have ‘enabled
the Commissioner to tax her on its full value
— UPS stock is publicly traded and easy to
price.’ Conversely, ‘a gift of membership units
in an LLC is harder to value [and] creates the
possibility of a more taxpayer-friendly valua-
tion’ because ‘provisions in the operating
agreement restrict members’ rights to sell’ LLC
units. These restrictions allow a taxpayer to
discount the value of stock by a percentage
that reflects the lack of marketability of LLC
units.28
Not wanting to pay any gift tax, the taxpayer
gave the trusts units equal to her unused unified
credit ($1 million) plus her available annual exclu-
sions (in 2002, that amount was $11,000 per donee).
Then, taking back a 20-year note bearing 5.37 per-
cent interest and requiring quarterly payments of
$83,476.30, she sold additional units to the trusts.29
According to the taxpayer’s estate planner, those
transfers effected a charitable freeze under which, if
the government challenged the gift valuation, an
excess would not result in additional gift tax but in
additional charitable donations.30
The IRS audit determined that each unit had a
greater value than the taxpayer reported so that
according to the government, the taxpayer’s gifts
exceeded her unified credit and the sales were not
for adequate consideration in money or money’s
worth. The government further declared that the
defined value clauses were void as against public
policy and, citing a regulation,31 refused the addi-
tional charitable deductions on the basis that the
24Id.
25Id. at 26.
26Id. at 27.
27Ward v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 78 (1986).
28Estate of Petter, 653 F.3d at 1015, n.1 (citations omitted).
29The court stated that the trusts regularly made those
payments to the taxpayer. Id. at 1015.
30Id. at n.2.
31Reg. section 25.2522(c)-3(b)(1).
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transfer resulted from a ‘‘post-audit reallocation of
units between the foundation and the trusts.’’32
While the government argued that the founda-
tions’ right to the additional units adhered only
after a successful IRS audit, the court held that the
transfers were ‘‘effective immediately upon the
execution of the transfer documents and delivery of
the units.’’33 Only the value of the units remained
unsettled. ‘‘The number of LLC units the founda-
tions were entitled to was capable of mathematical
determination from the outset, once the fair market
value was known,’’ the court said.34
The court acknowledged the practical unlikeli-
hood of a valuation challenge by the trusts or the
foundations and that therefore in reality an IRS
audit was required for such a challenge; however,
the court stated that this fact did not transform the
foundations’ rights into contingent ones.35
The gift documents defined the gifts to the foun-
dations as the difference between a stated number
of LLC units and a fixed dollar amount worth of
LLC units. Citing the Eighth Circuit in Estate of
Christiansen,36 which dealt with the application of a
similar estate tax regulation, the Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that the requirement did not prevent a
charitable deduction because the regulation does
not refer to a final valuation but to the existence of
a transfer. ‘‘Because the fair market value of an LLC
unit on a particular date is a constant, the founda-
tions received gifts of a determinable amount.’’37
The court then invited the government to change its
regulation if it disliked the outcome of the case.38
Procter
Procter reversed a Tax Court decision refusing to
assess gift tax on the taxpayer’s transfer of remain-
der interests in two trusts to his children, assuming
a balance existed after his payment of any amounts
due on his promissory notes to his mother. The
taxpayer had a vested remainder in those trusts
following his mother’s life estate. However, the
trusts were subject to divestment if the taxpayer’s
death preceded hers. In one of the trusts, the
taxpayer’s remainder was subject to the added
condition that he be at least 40 years old at the time
of his mother’s death.39
The government calculated the taxpayer’s gift tax
by subtracting the debt from the corpus of the first
trust and then computing the present value of the
remaining amount and the value of the second
trust.40 The Fourth Circuit said, however, that in
making its calculations, the Tax Court ‘‘reversed
that order. When the resulting computation indi-
cated that the present value of the corpus in the two
trusts was less than the taxpayer’s outstanding
debt, the court concluded that the taxpayer had not
made any taxable gift to his children.’’41
Because the calculations of the Tax Court were
considered based not on a rule of law but on one of
fact, and because the taxpayer and his mother had
not agreed to delay the note’s collection until after
her death, the Fourth Circuit stated that it could not
hold that the court’s method of computation was
erroneous.42 However, the circuit court held that for
purposes of determining the amount of the debt to
be subtracted from the value of the trusts, the Tax
Court should have calculated the present value by
reference to the taxpayer’s mother’s death and, with
the second trust, with the additional condition of
the taxpayer’s turning 40 — that is, when the
taxpayer’s interests could not be divested.43 After
that amount was deducted, the remainder was an
amount available to pay the taxpayer income for his
life remaining at the mother’s death and that would
pass to his children at his death.44
The taxpayer asserted that the Tax Court’s deci-
sion should be affirmed because (1) the transfer
would be subject to estate tax when the taxpayer
dies; (2) the interest is too contingent to be subject to
the gift tax; and (3) under the terms of the trust, the
gift was not to become effective if subject to a gift
tax. The court quickly dismissed the first two of the
32Estate of Petter, 653 F.3d at 1018.
33Id. at 1019.
34Id.
35Id.
36Estate of Christiansen v. Commissioner, 586 F.3d 1061 (8th Cir.
2009), Doc 2009-25102, 2009 TNT 218-18.
37Estate of Petter, 653 F.3d at 1023.
38Id. at 1023-1024.
39Procter, 142 F.2d at 824-825.
40Id. at 825 (‘‘It was stipulated that the present worth of $1
due at the death of a person aged 36, provided that a person
aged 63 shall have died before the person aged 36, is $0.25152,
and that its present worth, upon the additional condition that
the death of the person aged 36 occur after four years is
$0.24883. There was no stipulation or finding, however, as to the
present worth of $1 due at the death of a person age 63 years,
provided a person aged 36 years should survive’’). The govern-
ment then used the stipulated amounts for its computations of
the remainder values (after subtracting out the debt from the
first trust).
41Id.
42Id. at 825-826.
43Id. at 826 (‘‘We are told that the present worth of $1 at the
death of his mother was $0.56445, or $0.55377 when the addi-
tional condition is present that he attain the age of forty years.’’
By holding that the present value should be determined by
reference to the taxpayer’s rather than his mother’s death, the
Tax Court essentially held that the taxpayer’s interest was not
available to pay the notes until his death, a conclusion the circuit
court held was unsupported by the facts).
44Id. at 826 (The circuit court provided calculations to illus-
trate its holding, but left it to the Tax Court on remand to
calculate the values. ‘‘It is for the Tax Court, not for us, to find
the correct formulae and apply them to the facts’’).
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taxpayer’s arguments as already decided by Smith v.
Shaughnessy45 and Robinette v. Helvering.46 However,
regarding the third contention, the court stated that
such a clause could not prevent the imposition of
the gift tax:
We do not think that the gift tax can be
avoided by any such device as this. Taxpayer
has made a present gift of a future interest in
property. . . . A contrary holding would mean
that upon a decision that the gift was subject to
tax, the court making such decision must hold
it not a gift and therefore not subject to
tax. . . . It is manifest that a condition which
involves this sort of trifling with the judicial
process cannot be sustained.47
The court said its first reason that the condition
was contrary to public policy was that it would
likely discourage the government’s tax collection
because ‘‘the only effect of an attempt to enforce the
tax would be to defeat the gift.’’48 In discussing the
reasons to void the condition, the court emphasized
‘‘that it is not possible to obtain a declaratory
judgment from a federal court as to whether the gift
in question is subject to the gift tax.’’49
Robinette
In Robinette, the taxpayer was about to marry,
and she, her mother, and her stepfather sought the
advice of an attorney to ensure that their wealth
would remain in her family. All three created trusts
with successive life estates, with the remainder to
pass to the daughter’s issue when they turned 21
and with alternative dispositions if at the last sur-
viving life tenant there were no issue in existence.50
The taxpayer contended that in computing the
value of the remainder for gift tax purposes, she
should be allowed to subtract the value of the
reversionary interest.51 The government, however,
argued that a reduction in the value of the remain-
der interest was inappropriate because the value of
the reversionary interest could not be ascertained
through the actuarial tables.
The Supreme Court agreed with the government:
In this case, however, the reversionary interest
of the grantor depends not alone upon the
possibility of survivorship but also upon the
death of the daughter without issue who
should reach the age of 21 years. The peti-
tioner does not refer us to any recognized
method by which it would be possible to
determine the value of such a contingent re-
versionary remainder. . . . But before one who
gives this property away by this method is
entitled to deduction from his gift tax on the
basis that he had retained some of these com-
plex strands it is necessary that he at least
establish the possibility of approximating
what value he holds. Factors to be considered
in fixing the value of this contingent reserva-
tion as of the date of the gift would have
included consideration of whether or not the
daughter would marry; whether she would
have children; whether they would reach the
age of 21; etc. Actuarial science may have
made great strides in appraising the value of
that which seems to be unappraisable, but we
have no reason to believe from this record that
even the actuarial art could do more than
guess at the value here in question.52
Analysis and Conclusion
The Tax Court’s decision in Wandry, narrowly
construing Procter, was no surprise in light of Estate
of Christiansen, Estate of Petter, and Hendrix. How-
ever, it is unfortunate that the sense and sentiment
of Robinette and Procter did not play a greater part in
Wandry.
In Robinette, the Supreme Court refused to buy
into the taxpayer’s created complexities to reduce
the grantor’s gift tax. As that court stated, ‘‘Before
one who gives this property away by this method is
entitled to a deduction from his gift tax on the basis
that he had retained some of these complex strands
it is necessary that he at least establish the possibil-
ity of approximating what value he holds.’’53
A taxpayer who holds liquid assets like cash and
marketable securities and who, as the Ninth Circuit
in Estate of Petter noted, could have transferred her
stock outright, but realized that doing so would
have enabled the IRS to tax its full value, and
therefore transfers those assets to an FLP or family
LLC and creates ‘‘hard-to-value’’ assets in order to
obtain a reduction in gift (or estate) tax liabilities,
should not be able to use the federal fisc to have the
government value family entity membership units.
The Wandry court stated that there were safeguards
to insure valuation accuracy, such as the competing
interests of the LLC members. How likely is it in a
family LLC that that check is a real one?
45318 U.S. 176 (1943).
46318 U.S. 184 (1943).
47Procter, 142 F.2d at 827.
48The court gave two other reasons: It would require the
court to pass on a moot issue and it would render nugatory the
final judgment of the court.
49Id.
50Robinette, 318 U.S. at 185-186.
51Id. at 188.
52Id. at 188-189.
53Id. at 188.
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Wandry narrowly interprets Procter, but as the
Fourth Circuit in the latter case reminded us, ‘‘it is
not possible to obtain a declaratory judgment from
a federal court as to whether the gift in question is
subject to the gift tax.’’54 Likewise, it should not be
the function of the IRS to recalculate a taxpayer’s
gifts when the taxpayer has created the valuation
complexities in order to avoid the accurate and easy
valuation of his gifts. Besides calling it a waste of
the government’s money, I think someone might
call that chutzpah.
54Procter, 142 F.2d at 828.
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